We study cultural norms and legal enforcement in controlling corruption by analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan. Until 2002, diplomatic immunity protected U.N. diplomats from parking enforcement actions, so diplomats' actions were constrained by cultural norms alone. We find a strong effect of corruption norms: diplomats from high corruption countries (based on existing survey-based indices) accumulated significantly more unpaid parking violations. In 2002, enforcement authorities acquired the right to confiscate diplomatic plates of violators. Unpaid violations dropped sharply in response. Corruption norms and (particularly in this context) legal enforcement are both important determinants of corruption.
Introduction
The underlying causes of corruption remain poorly understood and widely debated. Yet the study of corruption beyond the realm of opinion surveys is still in its infancy, and there is little firm evidence relating corruption to real-world causal factors. Notably, both social norms and legal enforcement are often mentioned as primary contributors to corruption in both the academic literature and the popular press, yet there is no evidence beyond the most casual of cross-country empirics. 1 Distinguishing between the effects of social norms and legal enforcement is confounded by problems of identification: societies that collectively place less importance on rooting out corruption, and thus have weak anti-corruption social norms, may simultaneously have less legal enforcement.
Understanding the relative importance of these potential causes of corruption is of central importance in reforming public institutions to improve governance and on the current debate in foreign aid policy. The
World Bank emphasizes effectiveness of legal enforcement, but social reformers have highlighted the importance of changing civic norms in anti-corruption efforts. 2 We develop an empirical approach for evaluating the role of both social norms and legal enforcement in corruption by studying parking violations among United Nations diplomats living in New York City. Mission personnel and their families benefit from diplomatic immunity, a privilege which allowed them to avoid paying parking fines prior to November 2002. The act of parking illegally fits well with a standard definition of corruption, i.e., "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain," 3 suggesting that the comparison of parking violations by diplomats from different societies serves as a plausible measure of the extent of corruption social norms or a corruption "culture".
This setting has a number of advantages for studying corruption norms. Most importantly, our approach avoids the problem of differential legal enforcement levels across countries, and more generally strips out enforcement effects prior to the New York City government's enforcement actions of November 2002, since there was essentially no enforcement of diplomats' parking violations during this time. We thus interpret diplomats' behavior as reflecting their underlying propensity to break rules for private gain when enforcement is not a consideration. U.N. mission diplomats are also a relatively homogeneous group, selected for similar official duties in New York. Additionally, because U.N.
missions are overwhelmingly co-located in Midtown Manhattan -87% of missions are located within one mile of the United Nations complex -we avoid many concerns of unobserved differences in parking availability across geographic settings.
This approach allows us to construct a "revealed preference" measure of corruption among government officials across 149 countries, based on real rule-breaking in parking. 4 Corruption levels, particularly across countries, have proven to be challenging to measure objectively due to the illicit nature of corrupt activities. In our main empirical results, we find that this parking violation corruption measure is strongly positively correlated with other (survey-based) country corruption measures, and that this relationship is robust to conditioning on region fixed effects, country income, and a wide range of other controls, including government employee salary measures. This suggests that home-country corruption norms are an important predictor of propensity to behave corruptly among diplomats: those from low corruption countries (e.g., Norway) behave remarkably well even in situations when there are no legal consequences, while those from high corruption countries (e.g., Nigeria) commit many violations. It also goes somewhat against the predictions of standard economic models of crime in situations of zero legal enforcement (e.g., Becker 1968) which would predict high rates of parking violations among all diplomats in the absence of enforcement. Figure 1) . Thus, cultural norms matter for crime, but so does enforcement, a finding that resonates with the work of Becker (1968) , Levitt (1997 Levitt ( , 2004 , Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) and others on the responsiveness of crime to punishment. In our setting, the impact of legal enforcement appears larger than the effects of variation in cultural norms across countries.
The main theoretical implication of these empirical patterns, taken together, is that both cultural norms and legal enforcement play key roles in government officials' corruption decisions. They suggest that both factors should be taken seriously in debates about the causes of corruption and the policy measures to combat it.
Since the parking violations data exist at the individual level for all U.N. mission diplomats present in New York City (numbering roughly 1700 at the start of our study period), we can examine how individual behavior evolves over time. For diplomats from high corruption countries of origin, a model of convergence to United States corruption norms would (presumably) predict a decline in the rate of parking violations over time, as tenure in the U.S. increases. By contrast, a model of convergence to the "zero enforcement" norm discussed above would imply an increase in violations over time, particularly for officials from low corruption countries. We find evidence that the frequency of violations increases with tenure in New York City and that these increases are particularly large for diplomats from low corruption countries, suggesting that there is partial convergence to the zero enforcement norm over time.
Beyond contributing to the large literature in economics on the determinants of legal compliance, our work is part of a growing body of research on the importance of cultural background in explaining 5 See, for example, Fries (2002) .
individual behavior. Much of this work compares the outcomes and actions of immigrant groups from different countries. For example, Borjas (1999) finds that home country attributes are predictive of immigrants' economic achievement. In the social domain, Fernandez and Fogli (2005) show that fertility rates among Americans are correlated with fertility in their countries of ancestry. Also related to our work is Ichino and Maggi (2000) , who study absenteeism and misconduct of employees at an Italian bank, and find that region of origin within Italy predicts shirking.
We also seek to contribute to the growing empirical literature on corruption specifically. Other recent empirical research emphasizes the importance of developing corruption measures based on realworld decisions rather than survey responses; see Reinikka and Svensson (2004) and Olken (2006) for discussions. This paper is the first to our knowledge to develop a revealed preference measure of corruption that is comparable across countries. Finally, the importance of norm compliance and nonselfish behavior has been documented in the laboratory (see for example Ledyard (1995) ) and more recently Levitt (2006) provides evidence on norms of non-selfish behavior in the field.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the diplomatic parking situation in New York City and the violations data, section 3 discusses the rest of the dataset, section 4 contains the empirical results, and the final section concludes.
Diplomatic Parking Violations in New York City
Diplomatic representatives to the United Nations and their families are given immunity from prosecution or lawsuits in the United States. The original intent of these laws was to protect diplomats from mistreatment abroad, especially in countries not on friendly terms with the home country. 6 However, these days diplomatic immunity is more commonly viewed as the "best free parking pass in town" (BBC 1998 Drivers have 30 days to pay a ticket before it goes into default, at which point an additional penalty is levied (generally 110% of the initial fine). Diplomats then receive an additional 70 days to pay the ticket plus this penalty before it is recorded in our dataset as an unpaid violation in default. The information on each violation includes the license plate number, the name and country of origin of the car's registrant, the date, time and location of the violation, the fine and penalty levied, and amount paid (if any). The most common violation in our data was parking in a "No Standing -Loading Zone" (43% of violations), which is typically parking in someone else's driveway or business entrance. The remainder were spread across a range of violation types that imply varying degrees of social harm 10 : fines for expired meters accounted for 6% of the total, double-parking 5%, and parking in front of a fire hydrant 7%, for instance.
Also note that in 20% of violations the registrant is the mission itself, signifying an official rather than personal vehicle. While the majority of violations are located within a mile of either the country's U.N. mission or the United Nations complex, many are committed in other parts of the city. We return to the 7 Note that while the vehicle's diplomatic status is revealed by the license plate, the country codes denoting particular countries are unrelated to country names, e.g., the code (at the start of the plate number) for Mozambique is "QS" and the code for Nigeria is "JF". (Steinhauer 2002) . In addition, the Clinton-Schumer Amendment (named after the two New York senators), put in place at the same time, allowed the city to petition the State Department to have 110% of the total amount due deducted from U.S. foreign aid to the offending diplomats' country, although this latter punishment was never invoked in practice (Singleton 2004 Fortunately, the Bluebooks generally use consistent spellings across editions, facilitating automated matching across time. In most cases, the spelling and format were also consistent with the names in the parking violations data; the algorithm automatically matched 61% of diplomats in the violations database.
The first Bluebook we use is from February 1996, and we use this as our start date for calculating tenure at the United Nations.
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We obtained data on the number of diplomatic license plates registered to each mission from the U.S. State Department's Office of Foreign Missions, and we use these data as a control variable in some specifications. Unfortunately, these data are only available for 2006, though we were assured that the numbers are largely stable over time.
12 Table 1 
Cross-country data
We employ country-level data on economic, political, and social characteristics, and in particular consider data on country corruption levels using the measure in Kaufmann et al (2005) from 1998, the earliest year with wide country coverage. This is a composite corruption index that is essentially the first principal component of a number of other commonly used corruption indices, which are usually subjective measures based on surveys of country experts and investors. By definition, therefore, the Kaufmann et al.
measure is highly correlated with the commonly used indices and is extremely highly correlated (ρ=0.97) with the Transparency International (TI) ratings from the same year. For ease of interpretation, we reverse the sign of the original measure so that higher values indicate greater corruption. By construction, the mean value of this measure across all countries in their sample is zero with standard deviation one, and it ranges from -2.6 to +1.6 in our slightly restricted sample of countries. The main advantages of this country measure are that its method of aggregation is clearly defined relative to the TI measure, and it has broader country coverage than other indices. Our sample consists of all countries that had 1998 populations greater than 500,000 according to the World Development Indicators, and for which basic country-level data were available. Table 2 presents summary statistics for both the country-level and diplomat-level variables.
We include a number of other variables that may affect incentives to comply with local laws.
From the dataset used by Kuziemko and Werker (2006) , we generate an indicator variable denoting whether the country received foreign aid from the United States in 1998. We similarly generate a pair of indicator variables for military and economic aid, since these two types of aid may reflect different geopolitical interests: while economic aid recipients may feel beholden to the United States, those receiving military aid are typically countries that the United States seeks as strategic allies.
Finally, we include the logarithm of 1998 GDP per capita in U.S. dollars (taken from the World Development Indicators) in most specifications to control for income effects. Country-level income per capita is strongly correlated with corruption and with the rule of law, and some argue income is influenced by underlying corruption levels, complicating efforts to disentangle corruption effects from income effects. As we discuss below, despite this strong correlation the main corruption results are robust to including income controls. Second, we include the ratio of government bureaucrats' salaries to GDP per capita (using data from Schiavo-Campo et al 1999) for the early 1990s (exact year differs by country)
to account for the possibility bureaucrats occupy different positions in the national income distribution.
Empirical Results
A count model analysis is appropriate given the dependent variable, the total number of unpaid parking violations by country. We focus on the negative binomial model (the Poisson model can be rejected at high levels of confidence due to over-dispersion of the parking tickets outcome variable -result not shown). In the main econometric specification for the cross-country analysis, the dependent variable is sharply against diplomatic parking violators, and X is a vector of other country controls, including the log of 1998 GDP per capita, and region fixed effects 13 , among others depending on the specification.
The New York City unpaid parking violations measure is robustly positively correlated with the existing subjective country corruption index conditional on the number of U.N. mission diplomats for that country in New York City (Table 3 , regression 1). The relationship is roughly linear (Figure 2 ). The coefficient implies that the increase in the corruption index associated with going from a highly corrupt country like Nigeria (corruption score +1.01) to a largely uncorrupt country like Norway (score -2.35) is associated with a large drop of (48 log points) * (3.36) = 161 log points, or approximately 80%, in the average rate of diplomatic parking violations. The result is nearly unchanged if Kuwait, the country with the most parking violations per diplomat, is dropped from the sample (not shown). Parking violations also plummet in the post-enforcement period, by over 98% on average, indicating that legal enforcement is also highly influential.
The coefficient estimate on the country corruption index is robust to the inclusion of log per capita income (Table 3 , regression 2). This pattern argues strongly against the explanation that richer countries are simply able to purchase more parking spots for their diplomats, in which case we would expect a weakening of the relationship between country corruption and parking violations and a negative coefficient estimate on country income, but we find neither. The result is also robust to controlling for region fixed effects (regression 3). The Middle East and Africa are the regions with the greatest average number of unpaid parking violations relative to the reference region (North America and the Caribbean).
The inclusion of higher-order polynomial controls for income (regression 4) and an interaction between country corruption and the post-enforcement (regression 5) also have little effect on the partial correlation of the corruption index with parking violations committed. The interaction term between country corruption and the post-enforcement period indicator variable has little predictive power, indicating a largely stable relationship across the pre-and post-enforcement periods.
The results are robust to including the average government wage relative to per capita income (Table 4 , regression 1) and also to the number of vehicles registered to each mission (regression 2).
14 The inclusion of paid violations in our parking violations measure has no effect on the main results (regression 3), further arguing against the possibility that our country corruption measure is picking up an income effect rather than a corruption effect.
There is also strong evidence that many violations are not work-related. We focus on the subset of violations committed between the nighttime hours of 10 pm and 6 am at a distance of more than five city blocks (roughly one quarter mile) away from the U.N. complex, where most of the missions are centered. We find that a similar relationship between the country corruption and legal enforcement terms also holds for this subset of violations (Table 4 , regression 4).
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The strong relationship between the parking violation corruption measure and the country corruption index is robust to different function forms. It also holds if the dependent variable is log(1 + Unpaid parking violations) across specifications (Table 4 , regression 5), and is similar for an OLS specification with unpaid violations as the dependent variable (regression 6).
Several measures of "proximity" to the U.S. are correlated with fewer unpaid parking violations.
First, the log of the weighted average distance between a country's population and the U.S. population 16 is strongly positively correlated with parking violations (Table 4 , regression 7), indicating that diplomats from countries in closer geographic proximity to the U.S. have many fewer New York City violations.
We do not have a definitive explanation for this pattern; however, we note that it is not driven by trade volumes, which are not a statistically significant predictor of parking violations (coefficient estimate 0.04, standard error 0.07). Migration, tourism, and some broader cultural affinity between the countries are other possible explanations. Countries that receive U.S. economic aid are significantly less likely to commit diplomatic parking violations (with a large effect of 65 log points), suggesting that the goodwill engendered by these ties may help to limit abuse of diplomatic privileges in New York, and pointing to the broader role of sentiment in driving norm compliance.
17 15 The results in Tables 3 and 4 are nearly identical if distance from the country's U.N. mission to the U.N. Plaza is included as an additional explanatory variable (results not shown). We also examined the most socially egregious New York City parking violations. While impoverished diplomats from poor countries might be forced to park illegally in order to avoid the extra expense of renting a parking spot, they could still try to do so in a manner that avoids excessive negative social externalities. As indications of "extreme" violations, we considered (i) parking in front of a fire hydrant, and (ii) violations for double-parking on East-West streets between 10 th and 100 th Streets in Manhattan, relatively narrow streets where double parking can completely block passage. The main results hold robustly for both types of violations (not shown); in other words, diplomats from high corruption countries are much more likely to commit the most egregious violations. Hence our results are not driven solely by behaviors causing minimal social harm (i.e., an expired meter in a legal parking spot), or those where it may be unclear to the diplomat that he or she is generating negative externalities. 16 Distance from the United States is taken from Mayer and Zignago (2005) . Their measure uses city-level data to assess the geographic distribution of population inside each nation, and calculates the distance between two countries based on bilateral distances between the largest cities of those two countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the country's overall population. 17 An additional direct measure of affinity is provided by the Pew Global Attitudes Survey from 2002 (the earliest year that the survey was performed), based on responses to the question: "Please tell me if you have a very Since we can follow individual diplomats during their tenure at the U.N., we examine the related question of how diplomat behavior evolves while in New York City. Conceptually, the relative plausibility of socialization to U.S. norms versus convergence to a uniform high corruption norm is unclear. If convergence is to U.S. corruption norms, individuals from high corruption countries (e.g., Nigeria) should have declining parking violations over time, but there be should be no change in behavior for diplomats from the low corruption societies (e.g., Norway). Alternatively, individuals may begin their stay in New York City unsure as to the extent they can get away with violations. Once they successfully "got away with it" a few times (or heard stories about others doing so), diplomats may have become bolder in their violations. Thus convergence to this "zero enforcement" norm predicts increasing violations over time, particularly among diplomats from less corrupt countries.
In practice to estimate these effects we use a negative binomial regression like that discussed above, but with observations at the diplomat-month level of analysis. We include month-year fixed effects (α t ). The two key explanatory variables are the effect of increased time spent working as a consular official in New York City on parking violations, as well as the differential time effect for diplomats from countries with higher corruption (the interaction effect of time spent working in New York City with the country corruption index). Disturbance terms are allowed to be correlated across the monthly observations for the same individual. The parking violations included in the individual-level analysis are a subset of those used at the country-level: violations committed using official consular vehicles are excluded below since they cannot be matched to any one diplomat.
The frequency of unpaid violations increases rapidly and statistically significantly with tenure in New York City (Table 5 , regression 1), seemingly ruling out convergence to the U.S. norm of ruleadherence. On average parking violations increase by 8.4% with each additional month a diplomat lives favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States." This is coded to take on values from one (most favorable) to four (least favorable) and then averaged across respondents. In some specifications, the anti-U.S. sentiment term is a large and statistically significant predictor of more parking violations (see Fisman and Miguel 2006) . However, the result does not hold using the negative binomial specification and thus we do not emphasize it. A main limitation of the analysis with the Pew data is the small sample of only 42 countries. The data are available at http://pewglobal.org/ (accessed March 9, 2006). Several findings argue somewhat against this interpretation that non-legal punishments like media embarrassment or workplace punishment are the main drivers of our findings. First, a Lexis-Nexis search of 504 European news outlets (English language or in translation) using the terms DIPLOMATS and PARKING and NEW YORK yielded only 25 stories during the entire study period, and these stories were 18 Similar results hold with alternative specifications, including a linear regression model (not shown). When diplomat fixed effects are included in a linear model, the coefficient estimate on the interaction between months in New York City and country corruption is negative but no longer statistically significant. Results are virtually identical if individuals who arrived only after the earliest U.N. Bluebook was published are excluded, which allows us to more accurately capture tenure in New York City (not shown). concentrated in just four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia). Further, with the exception of several Russian articles, the stories were about the general problem of diplomatic parking violations in New York City and the 2002 crackdown, rather than reporting on the behavior of home country diplomats. The possibility of sanctions for returning diplomats who accumulated parking tickets while abroad is apparently not a leading media issue, in Europe at least.
Second, we considered whether unpaid parking violations early in an official's tenure at the United Nations in New York City is correlated with the length of his employment there, and further whether these early violations interact in any way with corruption in the country of origin (i.e., perhaps violators from low corruption countries could be punished by their government and sent home early). We find no evidence for any such effects of parking violations on diplomat tenure (regressions not shown).
Obviously, neither of these two findings is completely conclusive in terms of pinning down the exact channel for the culture results. In equilibrium the number of violations committed could reflect choices made, in part, to avoid home country sanctions. But they are certainly consistent with the widelyheld view among New York City officials that home country enforcement is typically weak or nonexistent.
19 A related concern is that public pressure could have a larger effect on diplomats' choices in a more democratic political setting. However, we do not find that the number of parking violations is statistically significantly related to democracy (as measured by the Polity IV democracy scale in 1998) nor is the coefficient on corruption affected at all by its inclusion (regressions not shown).
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Conclusion
19 Gillian Sorensen, former New York City Commissioner for the United Nations and Consular Affairs in the 1980s, claims that during her tenure U.N. missions in New York City rarely if ever punish their employees for parking tickets, even in the most egregious cases (personal communication, February 8, 2007) . 20 A final consideration is whether there is a differential selection mechanism for U.N. diplomats across countries that might account for the pattern we observe. In particular, it would problematic if the relatively more corrupt government officials (within the distribution of officials in a country) were selected for New York postings from high corruption countries. We have no rigorous statistical test to explore this possibility, but we feel it is unlikely to be of first-order importance for several reasons. First, U.N. mission staff are selected along a range of common characteristics, including English-language skills, education and diplomatic experience, and this reduces the gap between diplomats in terms of their personal attributes. Further, we are not concerned with differential selection of "corrupt" types into the government bureaucracy versus the private sector across countries, since we are interested in the behavior of actual government civil servants, like the U.N. mission diplomats we observe.
We exploit a unique natural experiment -the stationing in New York City of thousands of government officials from 149 countries around the world -in a setting of zero legal enforcement of parking violations to construct a revealed preference measure of official corruption, and then estimate how behavior changes when legal enforcement increased. We find that the number of diplomatic parking violations is strongly correlated with existing measures of home country corruption. This finding suggests that cultural or social norms related to corruption are quite persistent: even when stationed thousands of miles away, diplomats behave in a manner highly reminiscent of government officials in the home country. Norms related to corruption are apparently deeply engrained, and factors other than legal enforcement are important determinants of corruption behavior. Nonetheless, increased legal enforcement is also highly influential: parking violations fell by over 98% after enforcement was introduced. New
York City is an attractive location to study increased enforcement relative to many less developed countries, where official changes "on the books" may not always translate into greater actual enforcement on the ground.
The result on sticky corruption cultures raises the critical question of whether there are policy interventions that can modify corruption norms over time. For example, the Bloomberg administration's enforcement efforts in New York City in 2002 were extremely successful in changing diplomats' behaviors, and it would be useful to know whether these changes might additionally have had persistent effects on norms once individuals become habituated to rule compliant behavior. Such long-run effects of temporary interventions necessarily rely on a shift in norms (or tastes), and would be consistent with the findings of Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) on the persistent effects of auditing on corruption in Argentina. Unfortunately, our context does not accommodate this analysis. Understanding better how corruption norms evolve is likely to be critical for the success of anti-corruption reforms like those currently widely advocated by the World Bank and other foreign aid donors. Kaufmann et al (2005) . A higher score in the corruption index denotes more corruption.
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23 Negative binomial regressions in columns 1-3. White robust standard errors, disturbance terms clustered by country. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Observations are at the diplomat-month level. Month fixed effects are included in all regressions (thus the post-enforcement indicator is not included). The log(Per capita income, 1998 US$) term is included as a control in columns 1-2 (results not shown). 
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